WHY WE NEED REED: UNMASKING PRETEXT IN ANTIPANHANDLING LEGISLATION
Joseph Mead*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of areas where asking for help is restricted or banned. 1 Whether
called begging, panhandling, or solicitation, cities were spurred on by
concerns of business owners and residents to ban or highly restrict this
type of speech from occurring in public areas. Yet laws such as these
have been repeatedly struck down by courts in recent months, fueled in
large part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. City of Gilbert. 2
Federal courts reviewing free speech challenges to laws must first
decide how much scrutiny the law will receive. Courts review laws
deemed content-based under the highest level of scrutiny, which almost
always leads to a conclusion that the restriction is unconstitutional.
Rigorous review is justified by a worry that “village tyrants” 3 will be
swayed by constituents to suppress unpopular views from being
expressed freely in their cities. 4 Content-neutral laws, in contrast, are
still carefully examined, but with a more deferential posture. The level
of scrutiny is often the deciding factor in a law’s constitutionality. Reed
clarified the test for determining the level of scrutiny to be used.
Prior to Reed, some federal courts upheld laws that, on their face,
discriminated on the basis of content so long as the laws could be
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1. NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 21 (National
Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2014), available at http://www.nlchp.org/documents/
No_Safe_Place).
2. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
4. Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content
Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1264-65 (2014).
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“justified” by a non-censorial motive. 5 This approach led to two circuit
court decisions—subsequently reversed—that rejected First Amendment
challenges to laws restricting speech that asked for a donation.6 Reed
clarifies that a non-discriminatory purpose will not save a law that
discriminates on its face on the basis of content. Thus, Reed explained
that a law is a content-based restriction on speech if either of the
following are true: (1) the text of the law makes distinctions based on
speech’s “subject matter . . . function or purpose” or (2) the purpose
behind the law is driven by an objection to the content of a message. 7
Yet not everyone welcomed the Supreme Court’s clarification. For
example, Adam Liptak penned a powerful essay in the New York Times
suggesting that the potential sweep of the ruling is far broader than the
Court could have realized. 8
In this essay I argue that, at least in the context of anti-panhandling
legislation, Reed was a needed answer to local governments passing
overly broad restrictions motivated by a desire to drive an unpopular
type of speech from the city square. To illustrate my argument, I use
anti-panhandling ordinances from three local jurisdictions—the City
Akron, the City of Fairlawn, and Summit County—as case studies in
content-neutrality before and after Reed.
This essay relies on two primary arguments. First, I defend Reed’s
clarification of the test for content-neutrality as a needed measure to
prevent censorial purpose from being masked by local government in
pretextual reasons. To develop this argument, I highlight the mischief
caused in Reed by drawing on public records, newspaper articles, and
other contemporary evidence of legislative intent to argue that antipanhandling ordinances have become an exercise in concocting
pretextual justifications that bear little resemblance to the true motives
behind the restrictions.
Second, I argue that the restrictions found in anti-panhandling
ordinances locally and nationally are poorly tailored to satisfy any
weighty, non-censorial government objective, and therefore are an

5. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015)
6. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 806 F.3d 411 (7th
Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887
(2015), declaring ordinance unconstitutional on remand, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov.
9, 2015).
7. Reed,135 S. Ct. at 2227 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
8. Adam Liptak, Court’s Free Speech Expansion Has Far Reaching Consequences, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 2015, available at www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speechexpansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html?_r=0.
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unconstitutional abridgement of the right to ask for help. 9 In fact, every
single federal court in recent year (including several decisions issued
over the past few months) has sided with free speech challengers to antipanhandling laws. 10 I tie both arguments together as a way of illustrating
the problems with the City of Akron’s anti-panhandling law, which I am
currently in the process of challenging.
II. WHY WE NEED REED: PANHANDLING LAWS AS A CASE STUDY IN
PRETEXT
Before Reed was decided, the courts of appeals were in disarray
over how to assess whether a law was content-neutral. Many decisions
relied on language from the Supreme Court implying that restrictions
were content neutral if they could be “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.” 11 Using this test for content-neutrality,
courts would try to decipher the “purpose” behind a restriction to see if it
was targeting speech based on content or not. Courts following this path
would give only a cursory review even to ordinances that facially
discriminated against some speech based on its content.
9. These two arguments go well beyond the ground covered in my earlier essay on antipanhandling laws, which primarily focused on responding to common rationales justifying antipanhandling restrictions. Joseph Mead, First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 2015
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 57 (2015).
10. Norton v. City of Springfield, Case No. 13-3581, 2015 WL 4714073, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug.
7, 2015); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 232 (4th Cir. 2015); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d
867 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2013); Thayer v.
City of Worcester, No. 13-40057-TSH, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015); McLaughlin v.
City of Lowell, No. 14-10270-DPW, 2015 WL 6453144 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2015); Browne v. City
of Grand Junction, Colorado, No. 14-CV-00809-CMA-KLM, 2015 WL 5728755 (D. Colo. Sept. 30,
2015); Norton & Otterson v. City of Springfield, Case No. 3:15-cv-03276, ECF #14 (C.D. Ill. Sept.
23, 2015); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917
(D. Idaho 2014); Guy v. County of Hawaii, 2014 WL 4702289, at *5 (D. Hawaii 2014); Kelly v.
City of Parkersburg, 978 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (S.D.W.Va. 2013); see also Planet Aid v. City of St.
Johns, 782 F.3d 318, 328 (6th Cir. 2015); Cutting v. City of Portland, Me., No. 14-1421, 2015 WL
5306455, at *7 (1st Cir. Sept. 11, 2015); Joseph Mead, First Amendment Protection of Charitable
Speech, 2015 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 57 (2015). Two recent appellate decisions
initially upheld anti-panhandling ordinances, but each was subsequently vacated in light of new
Supreme Court guidance, and ultimately led to a final judgment declaring the ordinances
unconstitutional. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 806 F.3d
411 (7th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct.
2887 (2015), declaring ordinance unconstitutional on remand, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass.
Nov. 9, 2015).
11. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The government’s purpose is
the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others. Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is ‘justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (internal citations omitted)).
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This pre-Reed case law was a recipe for mischief (particularly but
not only in the context of anti-panhandling ordinances) for several
reasons: (1) it was difficult to determine purpose, (2) it was unsettled
which purposes were constitutionally suspect and which were not, and
(3) it led to a charade where law departments would invent rationales for
laws and throw them into ordinance preambles that were so unrelated to
the concerns actually considered by the legislators. These issues led to
an underprotection of speech that was disliked by majorities.
First, investigation into legislative purpose exists on perilous
terrain. Such inquiries are criticized even when conducted into the
relatively formal proceedings of the United States Congress. 12 At the
local level, the challenges grow exponentially. For most cities, there are
no committee reports, no records of extensive floor debates, no
discussion over amendments to legislative language. The few required
legislative procedures that do exist are commonly short-circuited by
councils eager to adopt new ordinances. In Ohio, for example, while
cities are typically required to give new legislation three readings,
councils can bypass this rule by deeming an “emergency” and enacting a
new law immediately. 13 Both Akron and Summit County exploited this
loophole when enacting their most recent anti-panhandling legislation,
reducing the time for the proposed law to be formally considered.14 In
light of the rushed formal deliberative procedures of city councils,
divining purpose becomes the difficult task of aggregating a variety of
individual motives into some sort of coherent legislative purpose.
Beyond information problems are the conceptual ones. Courts
struggled to define which government objectives were impermissible
attempts to silence disliked speech, and which were permissible.15 Early
decisions upheld panhandling bans after citing government interests in
creating a “pleasant environment,” attracting tourists, and preventing
exposure to “nuisance” were legitimate goals.16 By placing interests of
12. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
13. OHIO REV. CODE 731.17.
14. SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 2013-331 (2016); AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 356-2006
(2015).
15. Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling: Muddling A Weathered First
Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 249, 251
(2015); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 31617 (1997) (“[T]hese cases reveal an extraordinary doctrinal confusion over the most basic questions
underlying the Court’s content jurisprudence, and suggest that at least part of that confusion is
related to the Court’s failure to develop an adequate framework to engage in purpose scrutiny.”).
16. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999).
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potential listeners over speakers, these decisions gave governments wide
latitude to censor unpopular speech.
In 2014, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that listener
reaction to uncomfortable messages supplied a content-neutral rationale
for restrictions on speech, at least in the context of public sidewalks and
fora. In the course of considering a ban on speech near abortion clinics,
the Court explained that a law:
would not be content neutral if it were concerned with undesirable effects that arise from “the direct impact of speech on its audience” or
“[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.” If, for example, the speech outside
Massachusetts abortion clinics caused offense or made listeners uncomfortable, such offense or discomfort would not give the Common17
wealth a content-neutral justification to restrict the speech.”

The Court emphasized the fact that a listener on a sidewalk cannot “turn
the page, change the channel, or leave the Web site” to avoid hearing an
uncomfortable message is “a virtue, not a vice.” 18 Under this new
standard, courts have consistently rejected arguments that speech such as
panhandling can be restricted simply because it is bad for business or
tourism. 19
In contrast to concerns of listener annoyance and offense,
intimidation and public safety are potentially non-censorial motives, and
a government restriction based squarely on these might have satisfied the
test for content-neutrality prior to Reed. 20 But danger of censorial
motives remained even with laws purporting to promote safety. Once
more, this danger is vividly illustrated by the adoption of antipanhandling ordinances. It was simply too easy for law departments to
invent valid government rationales and throw them into an ordinance’s
preamble. 21 These supposed justifications for the ordinance
manufactured by the law department would be barely noted by the

17. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
18. Id.
19. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *7 (“The First Amendment does not permit a city to
cater to the preference of one group, in this case tourists or downtown shoppers, to avoid the
expressive acts of others, in this case panhandlers, simply on the basis that the privileged group does
not like what is being expressed.”); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise,
998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (D. Idaho 2014) (“Business owners and residents simply not liking
panhandlers in acknowledged public areas does not rise to a significant governmental interest.”).
20. See Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 232 (4th Cir. 2015).
21. E.g., Christopher Childree, How McCullen Affects San Antonio’s Anti-Panhandling
Ordinance, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 603, 608 (2015) (citing evidence that real purpose behind San
Antonio’s anti-panhandling ordinance was to promote tourism, not to protect traffic flow as recited
in preamble).

42

CONLAWNOW

[7:37

proponents of panhandling restrictions, who instead tend to rest
primarily on a dislike of panhandler speech.
For example, prior to Reed, a First Circuit panel considered an antipanhandling ordinance with a preamble that mostly (but not exclusively)
cited valid government reasons, but had been justified by its proponents
as a needed measure to suppress panhandling as a type of disliked
speech. 22 In a decision that has been subsequently reversed, the First
Circuit decided to simply credit the preamble and ignore the evidence of
censorship, upholding the ordinance after a deferential review. 23 Reed
abrogated this decision, and on remand the ordinance previously upheld
was permanently enjoined in its entirety as unconstitutional. 24
Or, consider the City of Youngstown, Ohio. The City initially
adopted an ordinance that simply banned “begging” anywhere in the
City. After I worked with the ACLU of Ohio to convince the City that
this flat ban was clearly unconstitutional, 25 the City repealed the
ordinance and replaced it with one that restricts solicitation in specific
ways. 26 This history suggests that Youngstown’s first preference would
be a flat ban on begging, but, failing that, restrictions to limit solicitation
as much as possible will work as a second-best alternative.
There is evidence suggesting a similar dynamic is at play behind
the anti-panhandling ordinances in Akron, Fairlawn, and Summit
County. Panhandling came to the Akron City Council’s attention several
times following complaints by merchants and visitors about what they
perceived to be too much panhandling downtown. 27 In 2006, prior to the
adoption of some of the ordinance’s most severe provisions, Akron
Deputy Mayor Dave Lieberth explained that restrictive anti-panhandling
rules would cut down on amount of panhandling, observing that “When
we survey downtown businesses, panhandling is usually the No. 1 or
No. 2 complaint.” 28 He testified that the ordinance was needed to combat
“a definite decline in downtown luncheon business” due to
22. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014).
23. Id. at 68-69.
24. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135
S. Ct. 2887 (2015), on remand, No. 13-40057-TSH, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015).
25. Letter from ACLU Attorney Joseph Mead to John McNally, Mayor of Youngstown, and
Charles Sammarone, Youngstown City Council President (June 4, 2015) available at
http://www.acluohio.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/LetterToYoungstownOhioRePanhandling2015_0604.pdf.
26. YOUNGSTOWN, OH, ORDINANCE 509.08 (2016).
27. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court) (at 1:21).
28. Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope stricter
rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 13, 2006.
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panhandlers. 29 Mayor Plusquellic chimed in that panhandling “is really
an almost disgusting way to take advantage of someone’s kindness.” 30
During a hearing, Councilmember Williams commented “there isn’t any
disagreement that we have a problem” and that panhandling was
“adversely affecting a number of people, whether it be businesses, or
people working downtown.” 31 And downtown businesses and
institutions testified in support of the restrictions as well, explaining that
panhandling was bad for business and needed to be stopped. 32 According
to press reports, the Act’s supporters repeatedly explained that the goal
of the panhandling restrictions were to cut down on the number of
panhandlers in the city. 33 Instead of panhandling, the Deputy Mayor
argued, “Akron as a city has quality programs in place to manage hungry
and homeless people . . . . What we want people to do is give money to
those programs instead.” 34
The preamble to Akron’s ordinance admits the unconstitutional
goal to simply reduce the number of panhandlers to satisfy the business
community. The preamble explains that “excessive and aggressive
panhandling has become a concern to business and restaurant owners
and their patrons,” and that panhandling was needed to “protect[] . . .
enjoyment of public spaces, particularly in the downtown area.” 35 It was
in the public interest, explained the preamble, to make public areas
“inviting for residents and visitors:” “persons should be able to move
freely upon the streets and sidewalks of the city without undue

29. Stephanie Kist, Panhandling issue draws impassioned testimony, AKRON LEADER
ONLINE, June 22, 2006.
30. Sandra M. Klepach, Council considers solicitors: Proposal to register city’s panhandlers
on tap Monday, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 17, 2006.
31. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court) (at 11:27).
32. Id.
33. E.g., Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope
stricter rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL June 13, 2006 (“City
Council will consider legislation Monday that would attempt to curtail what city officials call ‘the
panhandling business.’”); Phil Trexler, New Akron law tightens panhandling, AKRON BEACON
JOURNAL, June 4, 2008, available at http://www.ohio.com/news/new-akron-law-tightenspanhandling-1.99496 (“Two years ago, the city of Akron passed legislation hoping to get a handle
on panhandlers by forcing them to register with Akron police and giving them stricter guidelines on
where they can ply their trade.”).
34. Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope stricter
rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 13, 2006. Interestingly, the
program that the City apparently wanted to support is not actually a City program at all, but a
church that requires all individuals to attend a chapel service before receiving any help. Service
information about the Haven of Rest, HAVEN OF REST, https://havenofrest.org/do-you-need-help/
35. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 356-2006 (2015).
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interference from or intimidation or harassment by panhandlers.” 36 The
only evidence cited in support of the ordinance were unidentified
“studies and reports” and “testimony” on the “effects of panhandling on
businesses and individuals.” 37 Yet also thrown into the preamble are
unadorned invocations of public safety and access which also
purportedly justify the law. 38 Supporters of the law testified that
panhandling wasn’t actually unsafe, 39 and these safety concerns were not
the focus of the testimony considered by council in support of the
legislation. 40 Yet they were thrown in as part of the charade that the preReed cases required cities to act out. Prior to Reed, a reviewing court
deciding whether the ordinance was content-based would have to
undertake an undefined inquiry into all of this evidence—and more—to
ascertain which statements and motives count, and for which purpose.
A similar dynamic existed in Fairlawn. The preamble to the City of
Fairlawn’s anti-panhandling ordinance cites only “safety and welfare”
concerns, 41 yet according to press reports, the comments from the
members of council simply emphasized ridding the town of undesired
speakers. The Mayor expressed his disbelief that begging was
constitutionally protected. 42 City Council President explained that “I’ve
always been of the belief that if you want to give, give to a charity, not
the people on the streets.” 43 Another Council Member hoped that the law
would “deter people from panhandling. It gives the city a better
appearance.” 44 These unconstitutional motives 45 help explain why the
law is written as broadly as it is, do little to tailor restrictions to public

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court).
40. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court). Indeed, the strongest “evidence” adduced during the testimony in support of the
safety rationale were a few “friend of a friend” anecdotes of criminal behavior—behavior, such as
theft that was already illegal under existing law—supposedly committed by a solicitor. The Act’s
supporters admitted that the real concern was the perception of safety: even when there is no threat,
suburbanites experience fear when being approached by a stranger asking for a donation. Id. One
supporter implied that someone being approached by a “black man, a black gentleman” who is
asking for money would feel intimidated. Id. (25:00). This is hardly the stuff of solid constitutional
decision-making.
41. FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 2012-016A (2015).
42. Scott Piepho, Are Fairlawn’s Panhandling Regulations Constitutional?, DAILY LEGAL
NEWS (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.akronlegalnews.com/editorial/3621
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Mead, supra note 9.
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safety concerns, and instead effectively driving all panhandling from the
City. 46
Prior to Reed, these anti-solicitation laws were constitutionally
questionable, but they stood a fighting chance in court. As long as law
directors were clever enough to throw in some public safety recitations,
there was always the chance that courts would ignore the substantial
evidence of pretext, and uphold even laws that on their face target a
single type of speech. Perhaps more troubling, discussed below, the
ultimately enacted restrictions often bore so little relationship with the
supposed interests being advanced that it became almost laughable.
Reed changes the calculus. No longer is the city law director’s job
simply an imaginative exercise in writing fictitious preambles. Reed tells
cities to instead pass restrictions that either don’t discriminate on the
basis of content, or that are narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest. As discussed in the next section, this analysis is
fatal for anti-solicitation ordinances.
III. ORDINANCES THAT SINGLE OUT SOLICITATION FOR SPECIAL
RESTRICTIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Under Reed, any law that draws distinctions based on speech’s
“subject matter . . . function or purpose” is a content-based rule that is
presumptively unconstitutional that must overcome strict scrutiny. 47
Anti-panhandling ordinances on their face impose restrictions on
solicitation that do not exist for other types of speech, and therefore are
content-based, regardless of the government’s supposed purpose in
enacting them. 48
Content-based laws “are presumptively unconstitutional and may
be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests.” 49 This is “the most demanding test
known to constitutional law.” 50 Virtually every law fails to survive the

46. Sean Patrick, Fairlawn panhandling rules get thumbs up, Akron.Com (May 31, 2012)
available at http://akron.com/akron-ohio-community-news.asp?aID=16096.
47. Reed., 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
48. See id. at 2229 (citing an “improper solicitation” regulation as a content-based
restriction); Planet Aid, 782 F.3d at 328 (restriction on “charitable solicitation and giving” was
content-based); accord, e.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015)
(concluding anti-panhandling law was content-based); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL
6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015) (same); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144 (same); Browne
v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (same).
49. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
50. Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
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strict scrutiny analysis.51
When one appreciates the demands of the strict scrutiny test, it is
not surprised that every single federal court to consider the matter has
found anti-panhandling ordinances to fail strict scrutiny. 52 In fact,
recognizing the futility of the argument, other cities have not even
bothered to defend their laws against a strict scrutiny analysis. 53
It is common for anti-panhandling ordinances to impose limits on
when, where, and how people are permitted to ask for an immediate
donation of money. The City of Akron, for example, bans solicitation
after sunset. 54 During winter months, when hours of daylight are limited
in Northeast Ohio, this can mean that solicitation must stop as early as 5
in the afternoon. 55 This restriction explicitly includes solicitation that
takes place on private property, thus making it illegal for the food bank,
the art museum, the University of Akron, or anyone else in the city to
request a donation after sunset even on their own property. There has
been no evidence before, during, or after the ordinance’s enactment that
would explain how such a broad and clumsy ban is carefully written to
further a compelling interest. Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the
Sixth Circuit have struck down such time restrictions on solicitation. 56
Another common—but regularly struck down 57—provision found
51. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
52. E.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144;
Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, No. 14-CV-00809-CMA-KLM, 2015 WL 3568313, at
*1 (D. Colo. June 8, 2015); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d at 917 ;
Guy, 2014 WL 4702289, at *5; Kelly , 978 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
53. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); ACLU of Nevada v.
City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As the City concedes, the solicitation
ordinance cannot survive strict scrutiny.”).
54. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(B) (2015).
55. AKRON, OH, USA — SUNRISE, SUNSET, AND DAYLENGTH, http://www.timeanddate.com/
sun/usa/akron?month=1 (last visited April 22, 2016).
56. Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir. 2012) (striking
down 6:00 P.M. curfew for door-to-door solicitation); City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action
Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Watseka has failed to offer evidence that its 5:00
P.M. to 9:00 P.M. ban on solicitation is narrowly tailored to achieve Watseka’s legitimate
objectives. Watseka failed to show both the necessary relationship between the ban and its
objectives, and that it could not achieve its objectives by less restrictive means.”), aff’d without
opinion, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987). “[L]ower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court until
such time as the Court informs them that they are not.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45
(1975) (internal alterations and quotations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015);
McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144; Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755,
at *13 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015); Wilkinson v. Utah, 860 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1290 (D. Utah 2012).
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in anti-panhandling ordinances are solicitation-free buffer zones around
various locations in a city. Consider, for example, the City of Akron’s
decision to establish solicitation-free zones around churches, the Akron
Art Museum, the Lock 3 Park, the Akron Civic Theater, Canal Park
Stadium, outdoor restaurants, and various other landmarks within the
City. 58 No valid government objective is apparent in these zones; they
can be explained only by the censorial goal of sparing churchgoers,
museum patrons, and park visitors the indignity of being exposed to
panhandlers. 59 A similar problem exists for solicitation-free zones
around outdoor restaurants and bus stops, 60 which have been struck
down repeatedly by courts over the lack few years for being
insufficiently tailored to a valid government goal. 61
Other buffer zones bear at least a plausible connection to legitimate
government goals, but the lack of narrow tailoring has proved fatal for
these geographic restrictions time and again. For example, restrictions
on panhandling near busy intersections at least plausibly further a noncensorial objective of preventing injury to panhandlers and motorists.
Indeed, many cities’ geographic restrictions on panhandling are so
ill-suited to further safety goals that they would fail even under the more
friendly intermediate scrutiny. Under this more forgiving standard, a law
“still must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest.” 62 “As the [Supreme] Court explained in McCullen, however,
the burden of proving narrow tailoring requires the County to prove that
it actually tried other methods to address the problem.” 63 Even
potentially content-neutral bans on behavior commonly associated with
panhandling—such as standing near a roadway—have failed to survive
intermediate scrutiny given the lack of tailoring and evidence to support
the restrictions. 64
Similarly unconstitutional are the ordinance’s provisions that
58. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(B) (2015).
59. In a different context and a different city, sidewalk congestion could conceivably be a
non-censorial motive for a content-neutral ban on speech in limited areas. However, the idea that
sidewalk congestion is a genuine concern in the City of Akron is laughable.
60. AKRON OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(C)(1), (8) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE
636.26(b)(C), (E) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 537.15(c)(1)(C), (E) (2016).
61. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *11 (“No theory or evidence has been offered as to
how pedestrians walking near an outdoor café are unusually threatened by panhandlers.”);
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. 998 F.Supp.2d at 917.
62. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534 (quotation omitted).
63. Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 231 (emphasis in original).
64. Cutting, No. 14-1421, 2015 WL 5306455, at *7 (striking down content-neutral
restrictions used against panhandlers); Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 232 (same); Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *14 (D. Mass. 2015) (same).
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impose limits on how a donation may be requested. For example asking
for a donation is a group of two or more is deemed “intimidating” in
Fairlawn and Summit County and flatly prohibited, 65 variously
criminalizing two Salvation Army volunteers standing together to collect
holiday donations, two Girl Scouts raising money for an animal shelter,
or even a Halloween trick-or-treater accompanied by a parent. Plainly,
this ban sweeps much more broadly than could possibly be justified by
evidence-backed governmental objective, and “violate[s] not only
speech rights but association and assembly rights as well.” 66 In fact, the
Supreme Court has already struck down a similar prohibition for exactly
these reasons. 67 This example provides an excellent illustration on why
courts should look behind a city’s labeling of speech as “aggressive” or
“intimidating,” and probe what precisely is being prohibited.
Other restrictions on solicitation labelled “aggressive” raise similar
issues. Akron, Fairlawn, and Summit County have adopted restrictions
prohibiting a solicitor from blocking the path of a person, walking
alongside a person, or asking a person to reconsider a “no” answer. 68
These provisions are not sufficiently related to the City’s goal of public
safety (or any other compelling interest) to be justified. The City can
regulate “true threats,” but standing in the middle of a sidewalk, walking
alongside a person for a few feet while making your case, or asking a
person who said “no” to reconsider hardly meets this standard. 69 The
lack of narrow tailoring proved fatal to three other ordinances containing
indistinguishable provisions in the last year. 70
The broader issue with restrictions on solicitation labelled
“intimidating” (or, for that matter “misleading” 71) is that there is no
65. FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 636.26(c)(1)(E) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE
537.15(d)(1)(E) (2016).
66. Mead, supra note 9, at 62.
67. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (striking down ordinance that
made it unlawful to assemble in 3 or more persons in a manner “annoying” to others).
68. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(D) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 636.26(c)(B),
(C) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 537.15(d)(1)(B), (C) (2016).
69. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
70. See, e.g., Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015)
(striking down provisions against blocking path and following a person after they gave a negative
response); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *9 (“The bans on following a person and
panhandling after a person has given a negative response are not the least restrictive means
available”); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755, at *12-13 (D. Colo.
Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he Court does not believe[] that a repeated request for money or other thing of
value necessarily threatens public safety.”).
71. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(E) (2015). As was true for behavior deemed
“intimidating,” the types of speech designated “misleading” are broader than simple fraud. For
example, by restricting use of makeup and “indicia of physical disability,” Akron made it illegal for
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reason why a content-based restriction is needed, particularly given the
existence of content-neutral laws against, for instance, disorderly
conduct and fraud. 72 Even in the limited areas such as true threats,
fighting words, obscenity, and fraud which are carved out from First
Amendment protection, a government typically cannot impose contentbased bans. 73 For example, even though a state may regulate obscenity,
“it may not prohibit . . . only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages.” 74 Even if the ordinances were more carefully
written to prohibit only true threats and actual fraud, governments have
no compelling reason for selectively criminalizing these categories based
on the subject matter of the speech. And, once more, a court recently
struck down a law against coercive panhandling on precisely these
grounds. 75
Finally, perhaps the most odious provision of the Akron and
Fairlawn ordinances are their mandate that all solicitors pre-register with
the police by visiting a downtown police station, filling out an
application, being photographed and fingerprinted, and obtaining a
license before asking anyone for help. 76 “It is offensive—not only to the
values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free
society—that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must
first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and
then obtain a permit to do so.” 77 Thus, the City of Cincinnati repealed its
similar registration requirement for panhandlers following an adverse
court decision. 78 Tellingly, the City of Canton’s law director explained
that a permit requirement for panhandlers would be unconstitutional. 79
The unconstitutionality of the registration mandates are
underscored by the motives for enacting them. As explained in the

trick or treaters to ask for donations to a charity while dressed as, for instance, a one-eyed, hookhanded, or peg-legged pirate—despite the absence of any true risk of fraud. Akron Ord.
135.10(E)(4)-(6).
72. Ohio Rev. Code 2917.11.
73. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (striking down content-based statute
that regulated fighting words, even though government could have outlawed the same conduct in a
content-neutral manner).
74. Id.
75. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *9 (striking down law against coercive panhandling).
76. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(F) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 832.01 (2015).
77. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002).
78. Henry v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, No. C-1-03-509, 2005 WL 1198814 at *10 (S.D. Ohio
2005).
79. Kelly Byer, Panhandlers give their side; regulations, opinions differ, CantonRep.com,
http://cantonrep.com/article/20140707/NEWS/140709530.
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testimony of Akron police captain Daniel Zampelli, the registration
requirement would increase the “hassle factor” by “mak[ing] it easier for
police to approach and question panhandlers, check for outstanding
warrants and make sure they’re in compliance, even if they’re not being
aggressive.” 80 As the Act’s chief proponent, Deputy Mayor Lieberth, put
it: “By requiring registration, we make it difficult for people to come
into Akron and panhandle and then go back to their communities.” 81
Clearly, hassling speakers and making it difficult to speak are not
legitimate government interests. 82 Like the other pieces of these
ordinances, the registration provisions are supported simply by a desire
to censor instead of any valid government purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the unanimity of recent decisions, anti-panhandling
ordinances that target charitable solicitations for special restrictions
appear doomed. In light of the Supreme Court’s teachings in Reed and
McCullen, and the dozen lower court decisions implementing them,
cities should revisit their anti-panhandling laws. Going forward,
hopefully city councils will learn to respect the constitutional rights of
everybody to ask for help, even when some in the community would
prefer less speech.

80. Council tightens restrictions on beggars: City hopes to satisfy merchants while avoiding
free speech suit, AKRON BEACON J., July, 11 2006.
81. Sherry Karabin, Business owners weigh in on the city’s panhandling ordinance, AKRON
LEGAL NEWS, May 27, 2011, available at http://www.akronlegalnews.com/editorial/233; see also
Phil Trexler, New Akron law tightens panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 4, 2008
(“Akron police say registration has helped keep the number of beggars constant.”).
82. The goal of deterring panhandlers worked to some extent, as spontaneous speech (a
person who is stranded, for example) is made virtually impossible and the difficulties of traveling to
the police station to register deter countless others. Bob Dyer, Beggars Multiply in Akron, AKRON
BEACON JOURNAL, Oct 12, 2009 (“If you’re thinking about registering as a panhandler, be
forewarned: It’s tougher than it looks. Of the folks who take out a temporary license, 62 percent do
not follow through and get their permanent license.”). In fact, one of the supporters of the ordinance
was a city officer who praised the fact that the registration requirement prohibited an individual who
was passing through Akron and were “panhandling to get on a bus, or something like that” from
communicating that need with Akron citizens. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee,
June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron Clerk of Court) (at 34:00). Yet the ordinance also backfired,
since it created a “City sanctioned ‘job’ called begging for money.” Brian Davis Testimony,
NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR HOMELESSNESS, available at http://www.neoch.org/akronpanhandling-ordinance/.

